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Decoy states for quantum key distribution based on decoherence-free subspaces
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China
Quantum key distribution with decoherence-free subspaces has been proposed to overcome the collective
noise to the polarization modes of photons flying in quantum channel. Prototype of this scheme have also been
achieved with parametric-down conversion source. However, a novel type of photon-number-splitting attack we
proposed in this paper will make the practical implementations of this scheme insecure since the parametric-
down conversion source may emit multi-photon pairs occasionally. We propose decoy states method to make
these implementations immune to this attack. And with this decoy states method, both the security distance and
key bit rate will be increased.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
As a combination of quantum mechanics and conventional
cryptography, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [1, 2, 3], can
help two distant peers (Alice and Bob) share secret string of
bits, called key. Unlike conventional cryptography whose se-
curity is based on computation complexity, the security of
QKD relies on the fundamental laws of quantum mechan-
ics. Any eavesdropping attempt to an ideal QKD process
will introduce an abnormal high bit error rate of the key.
By comparing subset of the key, Alice and Bob can catch
any eavesdropping attempt. Polarization and phase time of
photons are the most common coding method to implement
QKD. But, birefringence in optical fiber may depolarize the
photons, which makes the polarization coding unsuitable for
QKD based on fiber. Phase time coding is commonly used
for fiber QKD. Using ”Plug&Play” [3] or Faraday-Michelson
interferometers[11], phase time coding can be free from polar-
ization fluctuations due to birefringence of optical fiber. How-
ever, ”Plug&Play” may be vulnerable for Trojan attack. And
for Faraday-Michelson interferometers [11], it’s very sensitive
to phase fluctuations from arms between Alice’s and Bob’s
interferometers. To overcome this problem, active compen-
sation which makes the system more complicated and uneffi-
cient is used.
Alternatively, Walton et al. [4] proposed a novel QKD pro-
tocol based on decoherence-free space (DFS) and Boileau
et al. [5] developed this scheme to use time-bin and polar-
ization for encoding. In Boileau’s scheme, Alice can en-
code her qubit in the two-photon states as follows: |H〉|V〉,
|V〉|H〉, (|H〉|V〉 + |V〉|H〉)/√2, and (|H〉|V〉 − |V〉|H〉/√2, (in
experiment by J.-W. Pan [6], the four states are: (|H〉|V〉 +
|V〉|H〉)/√2, (|H〉|V〉 − |V〉|H〉)/√2, (|H〉|V〉 + i|V〉|H〉)/√2
and (|H〉|V〉 − i|V〉|H〉/√2), where H(V) means the horizon-
tal (vertical) polarization mode of photons. The two photons
are distinguishable by a fixed time delay ∆tp, which is known
to Alice and Bob. Then Alice applies a time delay operation
to the V photons and before Bob detects the two photons, he
applies a same time delay operation to the H photons. Fi-
nally, Bob detects the two photons in the |H〉|V〉, |V〉|H〉 basis
or 1√
2
(|H〉|V〉 + |V〉|H〉), 1√
2
(|H〉|V〉 − |V〉|H〉 basis. Due to the
fact that |ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉|V〉 − |V〉|H〉) is invariant under collec-
tive unitary transformation, this scheme is insensitive to phase
fluctuations from Alice’s and Bob’s interferometers. If the in-
terval of the time between the two photons is just ∆tp, Bob
will successfully get Alice’s qubit and this probability will be
2/3 assuming the collective noise is totally random. Besides
this, photons from the same pair can provide precise time ref-
erences for each other. So in this scheme, accurate synchro-
nization clock is unnecessary.
BB84-type QKD protocols which are the most-widely used
QKD protocol, needs single photon source which is not prac-
tical for present technology. Usually, real-file QKD set-
ups [7, 8, 9, 10, 11] use attenuated laser pulses (weak co-
herent states) instead. It means the laser source is equiva-
lent to a one that emits n-photon state |n〉 with probability
Pn = µ
n
n! e
−µ
, where µ is average photon number of the at-
tenuated lased pulses. This photon number Poisson distri-
bution stems from the coherent state | √µeiθ〉 of laser pulse.
Therefore, a few multi-photon events in the laser pulses emit-
ted from Alice open the door of Photon-Number-Splitting
attack (PNS attack) [12, 13, 14] which makes the whole
QKD process insecure. Fortunately, decoy states QKD the-
ory [15, 16, 17, 18, 26], as a good solution to beat PNS attack,
has been proposed. And some prototypes of decoy state QKD
have been implemented [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25]. The key
point of decoy states QKD is to calculate the lower bound of
counting rate of single-photon pulses (S L1 ) and upper bound
of quantum bit error rate (QBER) of bits generated by single-
photon pulses (eU1 ). Many methods to improve performance of
decoy states QKD have been presented, including more decoy
states [26], nonorthogonal decoy-state method [27], photon-
number-resolving method [28], herald single photon source
method [29, 30], modified coherent state source method [31].
And for the intensity fluctuations of the laser pulses, Ref. [34]
and [35] give good solutions.
As a BB84-type protocol, Boileau’s scheme is still vulner-
able to PNS attack. This problem will be discussed in details
in the section II, in which we propose a novel type of PNS
attack. In the Section III, we propose a decoy states method
2to overcome this problem. In Section IV, a numerical simula-
tion will be given. Finally, we will give a summary to end this
paper.
II. PNS ATTACK IN BOILEAU’S SCHEME
To implement Boileau’s scheme, an ideal two-photon states
source which is far from present technology, is needed. In
practice, two-photon states are generated by parametric down-
conversion source(PDCS), which will emit n-photon (n > 1)
pairs with certain probability. However, the state from a type-
II PDCS can be written like [32]:
|ψ〉 = (coshχ)−2
∞∑
n=0
√
n + 1einθ tanhn χ|Φn〉, (1)
in which, |Φn〉 is the state of n-photon pair, given by:
|Φn〉 =
1√
n + 1
n∑
m=0
(−1)m|n − m,m〉a|m, n − m〉b (2)
Here, |n,m〉a(b) = |H〉⊗na(b)|V〉⊗ma(b), a, b means the two spatial
output modes of PDCS respectively. By randomizing the
phase θ [15], we can write the density matrix of the PDCS
as ρλ =
∫
(dθ/(2pi))|ψ〉〈ψ| = Pn(λ)|Φn〉〈Φn|, where, Pn(λ) =
(n + 1)λn/(1 + λ)n+2, λ = sinh2 χ, which is half of the aver-
age number of photon pairs generated by one pumping pulse
and could be adjusted by the intensity of the pumping pulsed.
Therefore, PDCS is really just a photon-number states source
emitting n-photon pairs |Φn〉 with probability Pn(λ). For im-
plementations that do not apply phase randomization, Eve
may attack this QKD system more powerfully [36], There-
fore, for simplicity we assume that Alice have applied phase
randomization to her photon pairs.
Here we focus on the attack to 2-photon pairs, because the
2-photon pairs are dominant among the multi-photon pairs.
For the practical implementation [6] by Pan, Alice delays b
mode of the two spatial outputs of PDCS with ∆tp. Then
through phase-modulation by Pockel cells [6] 2-photon pairs
states could be described in creation operators form like this:
|−〉 = 1
2
√
3
(H+a 2V+b 2 − 2H+a V+a H+b V+b + V+a 2H+b 2)|vacuum〉
|+〉 = 1
2
√
3
(H+a 2V+b 2 + 2H+a V+a H+b V+b + V+a 2H+b 2)|vacuum〉
|0〉 = 1
2
√
3
(H+a 2V+b 2 + 2iH+a V+a H+b V+b − V+a 2H+b 2)|vacuum〉
|1〉 = 1
2
√
3
(H+a 2V+b 2 − 2iH+a V+a H+b V+b − V+a 2H+b 2)|vacuum〉
(3)
where, H+a , H+b , V
+
a , and V+b represent the creation operators
for horizontal polarized photons in a mode, horizontal polar-
ized photons in b mode, vertical polarized photons in a mode
and vertical polarized photons in b mode. For simplicity, we
assume Eve add a beam splitter (BS) to the both modes a and
b and we name the two spatial mode of the output of the BS is
1 and 2. Now Eve has 4 spatial-temporal modes a1, a2, b1 and
b2, and creator operators for horizontal-polarized and vertical-
polarized photons in these new modes are correlated to modes
a and b by H+a = (1/
√
2)(H+
a1−H+a2), V+a = (1/
√
2)(V+
a1−V+a2),
H+b = (1/
√
2)(H+b1 − H+b2), and V+a = (1/
√
2)(V+b1 −V+b2). Then
Eve can post-select the states that each of modes a1, b1 a2
and b2 has one and only one photon respectively. We should
notice that: although through just one BS the probability of
success of this post-selection is just 1/4, Eve may use many
BSs to make sure that this probability will be close to 1. And
states |−〉, |+〉, |0〉 and |1〉 will be transformed to:
|−〉′ = 1
2
√
2
((Ha1Vb1 − Va1Hb1)(Ha2Vb2 − Va2Hb2)
+(Ha1Vb2 − Va1Hb2)(Ha2Vb1 − Va2Hb1))
|+〉′ = 1
2
√
2
((Ha1Vb1 + Va1Hb1)(Ha2Vb2 + Va2Hb2)
+(Ha1Vb2 + Va1Hb2)(Ha2Vb1 + Va2Hb1))
|0〉′ = 1
2
√
2
((Ha1Vb1 + iVa1Hb1)(Ha2Vb2 + iVa2Hb2)
+(Ha1Vb2 + iVa1Hb2)(Ha2Vb1 + iVa2Hb1))
|1〉′ = 1
2
√
2
((Ha1Vb1 − iVa1Hb1)(Ha2Vb2 − iVa2Hb2)
+(Ha1Vb2 − iVa1Hb2)(Ha2Vb1 − iVa2Hb1))
(4)
where H(V)X represents state vector |H(V)〉X for abbreviation
and the same below. Then Eve could use a unitary transfor-
mation U1 to the photons in modes a1 and b2. The definition
of U1 is given by U1HVE0 = HVE1, U1VHE0 = VHE1,
U1HHE0 = HHE2 and U1VVE0 = VVE2, in which Ex is
an assist state of Eve and satisfying 〈E0|E1〉 = 〈E0|E2〉 =
〈E1|E2〉 = 0. Eve post-select E1 through projection P1 =
|E1〉〈E1| and then the four states will be mapped into the below
states with probability 75%.
|−〉′′ = 1√
5
(2|X〉 − |Y〉)
|+〉′′ = 1√
5
(2|X〉 + |Y〉)
|0〉′′ = 1√
5
(2|X′〉 + i|Y〉)
|1〉′′ = 1√
5
(2|X′〉 + i|Y〉)
(5)
where, |X〉 = (1/√2)(Ha1Vb1Ha2Vb2 + Va1Hb1Va2Hb2),
|Y〉 = (1/√2)(Ha1Hb1Va2Vb2 + Va1Vb1Ha2Hb2) and |X′〉 =
(1/√2)(Ha1Vb1Ha2Vb2 − Va1Hb1Va2Hb2). Now, Eve can
construct another unitary transformation U2 defined by:
U2|X〉|E0〉 = (
√
3|Z〉|E1〉 + |X〉|E2〉)/2, U2|X′〉|E0〉 =
(√3|Z〉|E3〉 + |X′〉|E2〉)/2 and U2|Y〉|E0〉 = |Y〉|E2〉. Here, |E〉
represents an assist states of Eve and 〈E0|E1〉 = 〈E0|E2〉 =
〈E1|E2〉 = 0. And |Z〉 is any states of photon in modes a1, b1,
a2 and b2. With U2 and projection operation P2 = |E2〉〈E2|,
3the four photon states will be mapped to the followed form
with probability 40%.
|−〉′′′ = 1√
2
(|X〉 − |Y〉)
=
1√
2
(Ha1Vb2 − Va1Hb2) 1√
2
(Ha2Vb1 − Va2Hb1)
|+〉′′′ = 1√
2
(|X〉 + |Y〉)
=
1√
2
(Ha1Vb2 + Va1Hb2) 1√
2
(Ha2Vb1 + Va2Hb1)
|0〉′′′ = 1√
2
(|X〉 + i|Y〉)
=
1√
2
(Ha1Vb2 + iVa1Hb2) 1√
2
(Ha2Vb1 + iVa2Hb1)
|1〉′′′ = 1√
2
(|X〉 − i|Y〉)
=
1√
2
(Ha1Vb2 − iVa1Hb2) 1√
2
(Ha2Vb1 − iVa2Hb1)
(6)
Obviously, with the states |−〉′′′, |+〉′′′, |0〉′′′ and |1〉′′′, Eve can
keep one pair and send the other pair to Bob through a special
channel controlled by herself. When Alice and Bob do basis
reconciliation, Eve will get all secret information. This is just
the same as PNS attack [12, 13, 14].
Let us review our attack strategy. First, Eve divides the
two photons in modes a and b into modes a1, a2 and b1, b2
respectively. With many BSs, success probability of this step
is close to 1. Second, Eve applys unitary transformation U1
and projection P1, she gets an intermediate state with success
probability 75%. Finally, She applys unitary transformation
U2 and projection P2, she gets the final state which she can
launch PNS attack immediately and success probability of this
step is 40%. Overall, for 2-photon pairs Eve will launch PNS
attack with probability of 75% × 40% = 30% or discard a
failure case with probability 1 − 30% = 70%.
According to the above fact and the discussion of Ref.
[12, 13, 14], we know the security distance (L) of this scheme
must obey P1(λ)(10−kL/10)2 ≥ P2(λ) × 30% in which k is the
transmission fiber loss constance. If we assume k = 0.2dB/km
which is a typical value of this constance and λ = 0.1, we ob-
tain L ≦ 37.4km. This is a highly unsatisfactory situation.
How to prolong the security distance is what we will discuss
in the next section.
III. DECOY STATES TO BOILEAU’S SCHEME
The rate of secret key bits (R) for BB84 protocol with non-
ideal source can be determined by GLLP [33]:
R > RL = q[−Qλ f (Eλ)H2(Eλ) + P1(λ)S L1 (1 − H2(eU1 ))] (7)
Here, RL represents the lower bound of R, q depends on pro-
tocol (1/2 for Boileau’s scheme), Qλ is the overall counting
rate for the photon pairs, λ is half of the average number of
the photon pairs, f (Eλ) is error correction efficiency, Eλ is the
quantum bit error rate (QBER) of the key bit, H2 is the binary
Shannon information function, S 1 is the counting rate for the
1-photon pairs, and e1 is the QBER of the key bits generated
by the 1-photon pairs. Similar to BB84 based on weak coher-
ent states, we need to modulate λ to several values randomly.
Through watching counting rates for different λ, we can ob-
tain the lower bound of S 1 (S L1 ) and the upper bound of e1
(eU1 ). Finally, RL can be obtained by equation (7).
Our 3-intensity protocol is: Alice randomly emits photon
pairs of density matrix ρλ, ρλ′ , and 0 (λ for signal states , λ′
(λ > λ′) and 0 for decoy states) , then Bob can get their count-
ing rates Qλ, Qλ′ and S 0. With formulas we derived later, S L1
and eU1 can be obtained. Finally, R
L is given by equation (7).
Now we drive these formulas.
The counting rates for the two intensity (λ and λ′) photon
pairs is determined by:
Qλ =
∞∑
n=0
Pn(λ)S n (8)
Qλ′ =
∞∑
n=0
Pn(λ′)S n (9)
where, S n represents the counting rate for n-photon pair states
|Φn〉. Then QBER for the λ (Eλ) is determined by:
EλQλ =
∞∑
n=0
enPn(λ)S n (10)
In which, en is the QBER of the key bits generated by the
n-photon pairs |Φn〉. Before the derivation of the formula to
calculate S L1 and eU1 , we prove that
P2(λ)
P2(λ′) Pn(λ′) 6 Pn(λ) for all
of n > 2.
P2(λ)
Pn(λ) −
P2(λ′)
Pn(λ′)
=
3
n + 1
((1 + 1
λ
)n−2 − (1 + 1
λ′
)n−2) 6 0
(11)
With this result, we can deduce the formula for calculating
S L1 :
Qλ = P0(λ)S 0 + P1(λ)S 1 + P2(λ)S 2 + P3(λ)S 3 + · · ·
> P0(λ)S 0 + P1(λ)S 1 + P2(λ)P2(λ′)
∞∑
n=2
Pn(λ′)S n
(12)
With equation (9), we have:
S L1 =
(P2(λ′)P0(λ) − P2(λ)P0(λ′))S 0 + P2(λ)Qλ′ − P2(λ′)Qλ
P2(λ)P1(λ′) − P2(λ′)P1(λ) (13)
According to equation (10) and [18], eU1 can be given by:
eU1 =
(EλQλ − S 0P0(λ)2 )
P1(λ)S L1
(14)
4With equation (13) and (14), S L1 and eU1 can be obtained.
Finally, RL is given by equation (7).
For experiment, 2-intensity decoy states protocol is quite
convenient [25]. In this case, Alice randomly emits photon
pairs of density matrix ρλ for signal states, ρλ′ for decoy states,
then Bob can get their counting rates Qλ, Qλ′ . We now deduce
the formula to calculate S L1 and eU1 just from Qλ, Qλ′ .
According to equation (10), the upper bound of S 0 (S U0 ) can
be given by:
S U0 =
2EλQλ
P0(λ) (15)
Then from equation (10), S L1 for two-intensity case can be
given by:
S L1
=
2(P2(λ′)P0(λ) − P2(λ)P0(λ′)) EλQλP0(λ) + P2(λ)Qλ′ − P2(λ′)Qλ
(P2(λ)P1(λ′) − P2(λ′)P1(λ))P0(λ) (16)
To get eU1 for two intensity case, we just set lower bound of S 0
(S L0 ) to be 0, then with equation (10) and (16), eU1 is given by:
eU1 =
EλQλ
P1(λ)S L1
(17)
Equations (16) and (17) are for 2-intensity case. With these
equations, we have established the basic methods to beat PNS
attack in Boileau’s QKD scheme. Next, we will make sure
that this decoy states method can improve the performance of
Boileau’s QKD scheme impressively.
IV. IMPROVEMENT BY DECOY STATES
Now, we will show the improvement for the performance
by the introduction of decoy states through the numerical sim-
ulations. In the followed discussions and simulations, we ne-
glect the error induced by channel and assume Bob’s mea-
surements are perfect except a few dark counts for simplic-
ity. According to Ref. [6], Bob’s measurement is equiva-
lent to the projection to the polarization states F and S de-
fined by H = (F + S )/√2 and V = (F − S )/√2 respec-
tively. We rewrite the encoding states |+〉 and |−〉 in the
form of F and S : |+〉 = 1√
n+1
∑n
m=0(−1)mFn−ma S ma Fn−mb S ma ,
|−〉 = 1√
n+1
∑n
m=0(−1)mFn−ma S ma Fmb S n−ma . For Bob, if he ob-
servers the FaS b or S aFb, it’s will be |+〉 while the FaFb or
S aS b is for the result of |+〉. According to Ref.[18], the trans-
mission efficiency for the n-photon pulses ηn can be written
as ηn = 1 − (1 − η)n, in which η is the transmission efficiency
of the fiber channel and η = 10(−kL/10), K is the transmission
fiber loss constance and L is the fiber length. Since our goal is
to show the difference between the original Boileau’s scheme
and this scheme with decoy states but not the exact RL verse
fiber length, we take the efficiency of the detector and loss due
to projection to the DFS space or other causes just as a part of
fiber loss and don’t care these values. We assume the dark
counting rates of the detectors is D. Since Bob must neglect
all the three or four folds counts, S n can be written as:
S n =
(1 − D)2
n + 1
n∑
m=0
((ηn−m(1 − η)m + ηm(1 − η)n−m)2
+ 4ηn−m(1 − η)m(1 − η)nD + 4ηm(1 − η)n−m(1 − η)nD
+ 4(1 − η)2nD2)
(18)
Then with equation (8), we can get the formulas to estimate
the Qλ and Qλ′ .
Qλ =
∞∑
n=0
Pn(λ)S n
=
2(1 − D)2
(1 + λη(3 − η) + λ2η2(2 − η))2×
(4ληD(1 − η)(1 + λη) + 2D2(1 + λη)2
+ λη2(1 + λ2(2 − η)η + λ(η2 − 2η + 3)))
(19)
For simplicity we neglect the probability that a survived
photon hitting a wrong detector, then en is written like:
enS n = [
n∑
m=0
(2ηn−m(1 − η)m(1 − η)n−mηm + 2ηm(1 − η)n−m(1 − η)nD
+ 2ηn−m(1 − η)m(1 − η)nD + (1 − η)2n2D] (1 − D)
2
n + 1 (20)
in which, the first term of the summation corresponds to the
case of the photons in modes a and b both hitting the detec-
tors. Only when n > 2, this term does not equal to 0. The
second and third terms in above summation represent to the
case photons in only one mode (a or b) hit the detector. The
dark count of one detector may result in QBER in this situa-
tion. The last term of the summation is for the case of all the
photons are absorded by fiber.
With this, we can estimate the QBER Eλ as:
Eλ =
∞∑
n=0
Pn(λ)enS n/Qλ
= (D + λDη + λη(1 − η))2×
[4λDη(1 − η)(1 + λη) + 2D2(1 + λη)2
+ λη2(1 + λ2η(2 − η) + λ(η2 − 2η + 3))]−1
(21)
Now with equations (19) and (21) and setting k = 0.2dB/km,
D = 10−6/pulse, and f (Eλ) = 1.2, the Qλ, Qλ′ , Eλ can be cal-
culated by numerical simulations. Then with equations (13)
and (14), the S L1 and eU1 can be obtained. Finally, the relation
between RL and fiber length L can be get. And the results are
depicted in Fig. 1. In Fig. 1, the solid curve is for the case that
no decoy states is employed. In this case, for the calculation
of S L1 and eU1 we have to assume that S n = 1(n > 2) and with
5equation (15), then obviously the S 1 is given by:
S L1 =
Qλ − P0(λ)S U0 −
∑∞
n=2 P2(λ)
P1(λ)
=
Qλ(1 − 2Eλ) − (1 − P0(λ) − P1(λ))
P1(λ)
(22)
The eU1 is then calculated by equation (14). With this method,
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FIG. 1: Lower bound of secret bit generation rate (RL1 ) verse fiber
length L. Solid curve: no decoy states is employed, Alice just emits
PDCS with half average number of photon pair λ = 0.1. Dashed
curve: for the 3-intensity case, Alice randomly used PDCS with half
average number of photon pair λ = 0.1, λ′ = 0.01 and 0.
RL is obtained by equation (7). From Fig. 1, we found that the
3-intensity decoy states method can improve the performance
of Boileau’s scheme dramatically. The longest security dis-
tance in original Boileau’s scheme is about 18 km while this
distance for 3-intensity decoy states method will be 40 km.
This improvement means about the 4.4dB increase in longest
security distance.
V. CONCLUSION
According to above discussions, we proved that through the
introduction of decoy states method, especially the 3-intensity
decoy states, the performance of Boileau’s DFS type QKD
would be dramatically improved. Thanks to 3-intensity decoy
state protocol the increase of longest security distance can be
4.4dB. This increase relays on the ability of 3-intensity de-
coy states protocol can obtain a tighter bound of S L1 and eU1 .
Furthermore one can estimate the information leaked to Eve
with high precision and higher key bit rate and longer security
distance can be obtained. We hope that our protocol could be
implemented soon.
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